Working with Textualism and Statutory Interpretation
I spent years reading briefs where every word was treated as having hidden meaning, and then I started working directly with Scalia's A Matter Of Interpretation Scalia methodology after it came out. The book itself is short, maybe 120 pages with notes, and it changed how my team approaches statutory construction almost overnight. Not because it's some grand new theory, but because it gives you a clear framework for something we were all already doing informally. The core idea is straightforward: statutes mean what they say, not what you think Congress probably meant. Scalia and Garner argue that textualism should be your starting point, not your last resort. You look at the plain language first, then move to structure, then maybe canons of construction if you're still stuck. It sounds simple but the practical application is where people trip up. I remember this one case from around 2018 where we were interpreting a federal regulation about "associated with" in a financial crimes statute. The opposing counsel was arguing for a purposive reading that would have expanded the scope significantly. We pulled the textualist approach instead. Looked at the ordinary meaning, checked the statutory structure, and found that the text clearly supported our narrower reading. The court agreed. Took about three hours of research where a traditional analysis might have taken two days going down legislative history rabbit holes.
The book walks through the canons of construction too, which most people use inconsistently. Scalia's approach treats them as tools but not as substitutes for actual reading. You don't reach for a canon because you want a particular result. You use it when the text is genuinely ambiguous after you've done your due diligence reading it.
The Practical Framework
Here's how I actually apply this in practice. First, read the statute or regulation in question start to finish without any external aids. Not once, twice. I usually end up with three or four reads before I write anything. Most interpretable provisions are clearer than people assume. The problems come when you let the search for meaning get complicated before you've even finished reading it. Second, check the statutory context. Does the definition section help? Are there related provisions that clarify the one you're analyzing? This is where structural analysis matters. Sometimes the answer is right there in the surrounding text and you waste time looking elsewhere. Third, and only then, consider canons. The rule of lenity, the constitutional avoidance canon, the presumption against retroactivity. These aren't automatic get-out-of-jail-free cards. They apply when you've genuinely exhausted the textual analysis and still can't resolve the ambiguity. I've seen too many people lead with canons and that's backwards.
Get the Full Details
One thing people miss is how much legwork plain meaning requires. It's not lazy interpretation. You have to actually work at understanding what the words mean in context. Dictionaries, corpus analysis, usage patterns. If you're going textualist, you can't be sloppy about it. The opposite of purposivism isn't ignoring meaning, it's taking the text more seriously.
Where It Breaks Down
This isn't a perfect method and I won't pretend it is. There are statutes where the text is genuinely indeterminate no matter how hard you read it. Ambiguity exists. Sometimes Congress writes deliberately vague provisions for political reasons and then you're left figuring out what to do. Textualism doesn't solve that. Another limitation: it doesn't work well when you're interpreting administrative agency actions. Courts give agencies Chevron deference in a lot of contexts and no amount of textual analysis will override that. I've had cases where the textualist reading was clearly right but the administrative framework made it irrelevant. That's frustrating and it's real. There's also the problem of legal evolution. Language changes. Words that meant one thing in 1946 might mean something different now and deciding which meaning controls is harder than the book makes it sound. Scalia himself acknowledged this but didn't fully grapple with how messy it gets in practice.
If you're dealing with genuinely ambiguous statutes where textualism hits a wall, looking at purpose and legislative history isn't cowardice. It's recognizing the limits of your tool. I used to be pretty dogmatic about this stuff early in my career. Got humbled pretty quickly. The real value of A Matter Of Interpretation Scalia isn't that it gives you answers. It's that it gives you a disciplined way of thinking about the question. Most interpretive disputes I see on the bench and in briefs are just people talking past each other because they're using different starting points. Once everyone agrees on textualism as the foundation, the disagreements usually get narrower and more manageable. Read it. Then read it again. The footnotes matter. And when you're writing briefs or drafting arguments, lead with the text before reaching for anything else. You'll be surprised how often the text is enough.
