Why Goran Hyden's Work Still Matters For Understanding African Constitutional Politics
I ran into Hyden's arguments when I was advising on a constitutional review process in East Africa back around 2014. The whole exercise was supposed to be consultative and inclusive, which is the standard framing these days. What struck me was how closely Hyden's analysis from decades earlier described what was actually happening on the ground. The gap between formal constitutional design and how power actually operates wasn't something new. It never has been. His work on Constitution Making And Democratisation In Africa Goran Hyden doesn't give you a template for drafting a constitution. That's not the point. What it does is explain why so many constitutional exercises across the continent follow nearly identical scripts while producing vastly different outcomes in practice.
The Core Problem With How We Think About Constitutional Moments
Most practitioners approach constitution making as a technical exercise. You convene experts, hold consultations, draft articles, hold a referendum, and you're done. Hyden's contribution cuts through that assumption by showing that constitutions in Africa don't function the way they function in the textbooks. They operate within a broader system of informal power structures that no clause can really address. One of the counter-intuitive things I learned from working with his framework is that strong constitutions aren't necessarily good constitutions. I saw this firsthand in a country where the document was painstakingly crafted over three years with international support, comprehensive public participation, and detailed separation of powers provisions. Two years after implementation, the same informal networks that Hyden describes had simply absorbed the new institutions and continued operating as before. The constitution looked perfect on paper. The reality was unchanged. This isn't because the constitution failed. It's because constitutions in many African contexts don't function as primary governing documents in the way liberal democratic theory assumes. They function as negotiated settlements between competing power brokers. The text matters, but the informal arrangements matter more for daily governance.
What Hyden Actually Argues About State Formation
Hyden's analysis connects constitutional processes to deeper questions about state-society relations. He argues that many African states emerged with institutional frameworks that don't reflect the social and economic realities of the populations they govern. The constitution becomes a site where this tension plays out rather than a resolution to it. The concept of the "captured state" is useful here. When hyden writes about democratization, he's not just talking about elections or constitutional clauses. He's talking about who actually controls the levers of governance and whether constitutional mechanisms can redistribute that control. The answer is complicated because constitutional change often gets co-opted by existing power structures rather than transforming them.
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Practical Implications For Anyone Working In This Space
If you're involved in constitution making processes, whether as a consultant, activist, or government official, Hyden's work should change how you approach the task. Here's what I've found in practice. First, spend significantly more time mapping informal power structures before you start drafting anything. I used to treat this as a preliminary step that took a few weeks. Now I spend months on it. The difference in outcomes is substantial. You need to understand who the real decision makers are, how they communicate, what their incentives are, and where the actual accountability mechanisms exist outside the formal system. Second, design for the informal reality, not just the formal ideal. This means building in mechanisms that acknowledge how power actually flows in your context. Rigid separation of powers models often break down because the informal networks operate across all branches simultaneously. Flexible arrangements that can absorb informal influence while still maintaining some accountability tend to be more durable.
Third, recognize that constitutional moments are rarely one-time events. Hyden's work helps you understand that constitution making is a continuous process of negotiation and renegotiation. The document itself is less important than the ongoing political settlement it represents. When that settlement shifts, the constitution will eventually need to shift too, regardless of what the text says.
A Specific Edge Case That Changed My Approach
I once worked on a constitutional reform process in a country where the formal president had enormous delegated powers but limited actual authority. The president controlled the budget and security apparatus but couldn't deliver basic services or maintain order in large parts of the country. Meanwhile, traditional authorities, religious leaders, and regional power brokers exercised real governance in those areas. The initial draft constitution completely ignored this reality. It assumed a unitary state with clear lines of authority from the center. We spent weeks trying to get stakeholders to engage with the draft and got nowhere. Every consultation meeting ended in the same frustration because participants were responding to a document that didn't describe their lived reality. The workaround was straightforward once I applied Hyden's analytical framework. We restructured the entire process around decentralized power arrangements. Instead of trying to impose a top-down model, we built the constitution around acknowledging and formalizing the informal structures that already existed. Traditional authorities got recognized roles. Regional autonomy got real substance instead of just administrative decoration. The security sector provisions reflected the actual chain of command rather than the theoretical one.
It took longer. The negotiations were messier. But the resulting document actually got implemented because it reflected how the country was already governed. The informal arrangements didn't disappear, but they got anchored to formal institutions that provided some accountability.
Common Pitfalls That Hyden's Work Helps You Avoid
There are several traps in constitution making that Hyden's analysis makes visible. One is assuming that international best practices transfer directly. They don't. The constitutional architectures that work in one context fail in another not because of poor drafting but because the underlying power dynamics are different. Another pitfall is over-relying on external facilitators. International organizations bring expertise, funding, and legitimacy. But they also bring assumptions about how democracy should work that may not align with local realities. I've seen constitution making processes derailed because the facilitators pushed for timelines and deliverables that didn't account for the informal negotiations that had to happen first. A third pitfall is thinking that public consultation equals legitimacy. It doesn't. You can hold hundreds of consultation meetings and still produce a document that reflects the interests of a narrow elite. Hyden's work pushes you to look beyond the formal participation metrics and examine who actually benefits from the constitutional settlement.
When Hyden's Framework Falls Short
I want to be honest about limitations. Hyden's analysis is strongest when examining post-colonial African states with weak institutional foundations. It's less useful for countries that have moved beyond the initial state formation questions. Rwanda, for example, has built remarkably effective governance institutions despite starting from a similar position. Hyden's framework doesn't fully account for how some states have escaped the patterns he describes. Additionally, the work tends to emphasize continuity over change. It's very good at explaining why things stay the same but less helpful at predicting or facilitating transformation. If you're looking for a roadmap for radical constitutional change, you'll need to supplement Hyden with other theorists who focus on agency and contingency. There's also a gender blind spot in his early work. The informal power structures he describes often exclude women's voices in ways that the analysis doesn't adequately address. Later scholarship has built on his work to fill this gap, but it's worth noting if you're applying his framework to contemporary processes.
How To Access The Material
Hyden's work on this topic appears in various publications and edited volumes rather than as a single standalone book. His research on state formation and democratization in Africa spans decades of publication. You can find his key arguments in academic journals, conference proceedings, and edited collections from Oxford University Press and other academic publishers. Many of his papers are available through university libraries and platforms like JSTOR. If you're working in this field and need the full bibliographic details for specific publications, I'd recommend checking his academic profile through Uppsala University where he spent much of his career. That'll give you the most complete list of his relevant publications.
Bottom Line
Constitution Making And Democratisation In Africa Goran Hyden is essential reading if you take this work seriously. It won't tell you how to draft a constitution or run a constitutional convention. What it will do is prevent you from making the kind of assumptions that lead to expensive, disappointing failures. The gap between constitutional text and political reality is where most processes go wrong. Understanding why that gap exists is the first step toward bridging it.
