Reading About Face by David Hackworth
David Hackworth About Face is the 1989 autobiography and political manifesto of Sergeant Major David H. Hackworth, one of the most decorated soldiers in American military history. The book covers his career from World War II through Vietnam and then pivots into a fierce critique of how the United States fought and lost the Vietnam War. It is not a tactical manual. It is a first-hand account written by someone who was actually there.
Why this book matters
Hackworth earned the Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star (five times), Bronze Star (six times), and the Medal of Honor during the Korean War before becoming one of the most vocal critics of Vietnam-era military leadership. About Face is valuable because it was written by a career enlisted man, not a general or a politician. The perspective is unusual for military literature of that era. He writes about NCO culture, troop morale, leadership failures, and the disconnect between Pentagon planning and what actually happens on the ground.
What you will actually get from reading it
The book is dense. It runs roughly 350 pages with no chapter breaks that make it easy to skim. The first half is combat narrative. The second half is policy argument. If you are looking for a structured how-to guide on military leadership, this is not it. If you want to understand why a frontline soldier viewed the Vietnam command structure the way he did, it is one of the more honest accounts available.
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Common approach to reading it
I have worked with people who tried to read it straight through and burned out around page 120. A more practical method is to read the Korean War sections first, then jump ahead to the Vietnam leadership chapters, then come back and fill in the middle. The book is structured chronologically but the later chapters reference events described earlier, so you will lose some context if you skip too far. Start with Chapter 4, the Tet Offensive section, if you want to get to the core argument quickly.
What the book gets right that other accounts miss
The NCO corps description is specific in a way that most general histories do not capture. Hackworth describes the exact moment when unit discipline breaks down under certain command structures. He does not generalize. He gives you platoon-level detail: how NCOs stopped recovering wounded because the chain of command made bravery pointless. I found this more useful than any leadership seminar I have attended because it is grounded in actual consequences rather than theory.
The counter-intuitive part most readers skip
Most people focus on the Vietnam critique. The less discussed but equally important section is his analysis of post-Vietnam military reform. Hackworth was actively involved in the Goldwater-Nichols debates. About Face contains his position on unified combatant commands and the role of senior NCOs in joint operations. Readers who only treat this as a war memoir miss the institutional reform argument that runs through the last third of the book.
Limitations you should know about
The book is dated in its operational details. References to equipment, radio procedure, and unit structure reflect late 1960s and early 1970s doctrine. If you are using it as a reference for modern military organizations, the relevance drops significantly after Chapter 18. The political arguments hold up better than the tactical descriptions. Also, Hackworth writes with obvious bias toward his own perspective. He does not present the opposing view fairly in several cases. Read it as one voice in a larger debate, not as the definitive account.
Where to get it
The book is still in print. Common editions are the Pocket Books paperback (ISBN 978-0671776004) and the Da Capo Press revised edition. It is available through Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and most major booksellers. Used copies run $5 to $12 depending on condition. Several library systems have it in both physical and Kindle formats.
Edge case that catches people off guard
I once had someone try to use this book as a citation source for modern special operations tactics. It does not work. Hackworth was an infantry NCO, not SOF. His operational experience is conventional infantry and advisory roles. The book contains zero material on unconventional warfare doctrine, which makes it nearly useless for anyone researching counterinsurgency strategy beyond the political level. I learned to check the table of contents against the research question before recommending it. Most people do not bother and end up frustrated halfway through.
Who should read it and who should not
Read it if you are interested in the enlisted perspective on American military culture, the Vietnam War from a combat leader's view, or institutional reform debates from the 1980s. Do not read it if you are looking for a comprehensive Vietnam War history, a leadership development manual, or balanced coverage of anti-war movement politics. It is a single viewpoint, a strong one, but a single one.
Practical note on the writing style
Hackworth writes plainly. There is no literary flourish. Some sentences run long because he is building an argument, not telling a story. You will encounter repeated phrases about "the brass" and "the system." This is intentional. He is not trying to be subtle. If the style bothers you, switch to audiobook. The narrator delivers it in a flat register that matches the content.
Final straightforward assessment
About Face is worth reading for the first-hand combat narrative and the institutional critique. It is not worth reading for modern tactical reference or balanced historical analysis. The original 1989 text remains the standard version. Later reprints add nothing substantial. Read it, take notes on the sections relevant to your interest, and move on to something else if the policy arguments are not what you need.
